Targeting in Social Programs


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Targeting in Social Programs

副标题: Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples

ISBN: 9780815778806

出版社: Brookings Institution Press

出版年: 2006

页数: 175

定价: 24.95

装帧: HRD

内容简介


Who should be first in line for kidney transplants—the relatively healthy or the severely ill? Should chronic troublemakers be allowed to remain in public housing? Should perpetually disruptive students stay in classes where they can prevent other children from learning? Prominent legal scholar Peter H. Schuck and leading economist Richard J. Zeckhauser take on such vexing policy dilemmas in Targeting in Social Programs: Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples.

Schuck and Zeckhauser present a rigorous framework for analyzing many of the difficult choices facing policymakers. Most social programs seek to help "bad draws"—unfortunate, often low-income individuals. Poor targeting of scarce resources, however, often undermines both the effectiveness of those policies and their political support. Many policy failures occur when officials allocate these scarce resources to two groups of bad draws: "bad bets," who will derive substantially less benefit from the resources than would other bad draws, and "bad apples," whose behavior in the program imposes significant costs on other recipients. The authors show how to identify bad bets and bad apples, and how to treat them in ways that promote the greater public good.

This provocative book raises the right questions, those that society ignores at its peril, particularly to its less fortunate members. The answers it provides and reforms it suggests, though rarely easy and sometimes incomplete, will point social policy in the right direction.

作者简介


Peter H. Schuck is the Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law at Yale Law School, where he has held the chair since 1984. His recent books include Meditations of a Militant Moderate: Cool Views on Hot Topics (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).

Richard J. Zeckhauser is Frank Plumpton Ramsey Professor of Political Economy at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is the coauthor, with Jonathan K. Spence, of The Patron's Payoff: Conspicuous Commissions in Italian Renaissance Art (Princeton University Press, 2008).

目录


关键词:Targeting in Social Programs